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that combines structural change with repeated product 
improvement. That is, the technologies in one sector of 
the model become not only increasingly capital-intensive, 
but also progressively productive over time. Application 
of the basic model to less developed economies shows 
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Since the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century, the world’s countries have evolved 
into two groups. The first group includes rich, industrialized, developed countries (DCs), while the 
second group includes poor, agrarian, less developed countries (LDCs) (Lin, 2003). Nevertheless, 
prior to World War II, only a few governments (most notably the Soviet Union) regarded 
economic growth as their direct responsibility and adopted policies for which economic growth 
was the primary stated objective, and development economics was not a separate field of study 
(Krueger, 1995). In the great revival of interest in economic development that has marked the past 
decade, attention has centered on two main questions: First, what determines the overall rate of 
economic advance? Second, what is the optimal allocation of given resources to promote growth 
(Chenery, 1961)? There are two different and occasionally controversial approaches to tackle the 
questions above, respectively. Analysis of the determinants of the growth rate is the main purpose 
of modern growth theory, i.e., neoclassical growth theory and recently endogenous growth theory. 
Efforts to provide solutions to the second question have relied mainly on the principles, e.g., 
comparative advantage, from trade theory.
1 
According to neoclassical growth theory (e.g., Ramsey, 1928; Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; 
Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965), which focuses on the process of capital formation with the 
assumption of the same given technology between LDCs and DCs, LDCs would grow faster than 
DCs and the gap in per capita income between LDCs and DCs would narrow because of 
diminishing returns to capital. Furthermore, if the marginal returns to capital continue to fall, the 
economy will enter a steady state with an unchanging standard of living. These unsatisfying 
conclusions of neoclassical growth theory have led the current generation of new growth theorists 
to formulate models in which per capita income grows indefinitely (e.g., Arrow, 1962; Shell, 1967; 
Romer, 1986, 1990; Lucas, 1988; Jones and Manuelli, 1990; King and Rebelo, 1990; Segerstrom, 
et al. 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991a; Rebelo, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
2 Regardless 
of the great contribution that modern growth theory and trade theory have made, neither of them 
can successfully explain the following economic phenomenon: after World War II, although the 
governments of many LDCs adopted various policy measures to industrialize their economies, 
only a small number of economies in East Asia have actually succeeded in raising their level of 
per capita income to the level in DCs.   
Lin (2003, 2007) addressed this problem by providing a reasonable explanation with intrinsic 
logical consistency. The argument is that the tremendous differences in economic performance 
among LDCs can be explained largely by their governments’ strategies for development. 
Motivated by the dream of nation building, most LDC governments, both socialist and 
non-socialist alike, pursued a catch-up type of comparative-advantage-defying (CAD) strategy to 
accelerate the development of the then advanced capital-intensive industries after World War II 
(Lin, 2003). The firms in the government’s priority industries are not viable in an open, 
competitive market because these industries do not match the comparative advantage of their 
particular economy (Lin and Tan, 1999; Lin, 2003). As such, it is imperative for the government to 
introduce a series of regulations and interventions in international trade, the financial sector, the 
                                                        
1  The chief criticism is that comparative advantage is essentially a static concept which ignores a variety of 
dynamic elements (Chenery, 1961). 
2  Please refer to Grossman and Helpman (1994) as well as Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) for the details of three 
approaches to formulate models in which per capita income grows indefinitely. 
  2labor market, and so on so as to mobilize resources for setting up and supporting the continuous 
operation of non-viable firms (Lin, 2007; Lin and Zhang, 2007a; Lin, et al. 2003). This kind of 
development mode might be good for mobilizing scarce resources and concentrating on a few 
clear, well-defined priority sector (Ericson, 1991); but an economy of this type becomes very 
inefficient as the result of misallocation of resources, rampant rent seeking, macro instability, and 
so forth (Lin, 2003, 2007). By contrast, an LDC governments, e.g. the newly industrialized 
economies in Asia and recently China,
3 may pursue a comparative-advantage-following (CAF) 
strategy. In CAF, the government attempts to induce a firm’s entry in a industry according to the 
economy’s existing comparative advantage, and to facilitate the firm’s adoption of appropriate 
technology by borrowing at low cost from the more advanced countries. With this strategy, the 
economy may enjoy rapid growth that could be greater than that in the DCs owing to the 
advantage of the latter-comers and the faster upgrades in factor endowments in the LDC (Lin, 
2003; Lin and Zhang, 2006; and Zhang, 2006). Thus, the convergence of LDCs with DCs could be 
realized. 
At the Marshall Lectures at Cambridge University on October 31-November 1, 2007, Lin 
used per capita income as a proxy for the relative abundance of capital and labor in an economy 
and argued: 
When Japan initiated its automobile-production in the mid-1960s, its per capita income was 
more than 40 percent of that in the United States. The automobile industry was not the most 
advanced, capital-intensive industry at that time nor was Japan a capital-scarce economy. 
Thus, Japan has achieved great success in automotive industry since the mid-1960s. When 
South Korea instituted an industrial policy for automotive production in the mid-1970s, its 
per capita income was about only 20 percent of that of the United States and about 30 
percent of that of Japan. This could explain why South Korea has achieved a limited degree 
of success in automotive industry after the mid-1970s. The automotive industries in China 
and India were started in the 1950s when their per capita income was less than 10 percent of 
that of the United States. The automobile firms in both countries were not viable; therefore 
their survival required continuous government protection 30 years after their establishment. 
(cited in Lin, 2007) 
 
Table 1. Level of Per Capita Income (1990 Geary-Khamis dollars) 
  United States  Japan  South Korea  India  China 
1955 10,970 2,695 1,197  665  818 
1965 14,017 5,771 1.578  785  945 
1975 16,060  10,973 3,475  900  1,250 
Source: Maddison Angus, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992. Washington, DC: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1995, pp. 196-205. 
 
The main purpose of the present paper is to develop an endogenous growth model that 
combines structural change with repeated product improvements to discuss the issues of optimal 
industrial structure, the (most) appropriate technology, and economic growth in an LDC in a 
                                                        
3  Hsieh and Klenow (2007) argues that both China and India would get big TFP (Total Factor Productivity) gains 
from rationalizing allocation of capital and labor in both countries (TFP would double), while China appears to 
have benefited from recent reform efforts, but India shows little gain. 
  3dynamic general-equilibrium framework. Our paper pertains to work on structural change, i.e., the 
systematic change in the relative importance of various sectors (e.g., Kuznets, 1957, 1973; 
Chenery, 1960; Baumol, 1967; Laitner, 2000; Kongsamut, et al. 2001; and Ngai and Pissarides, 
2007). In Kongsamut, et al. (2001), the production function of the different sectors, i.e., 
agriculture, services, and manufacturing, are proportional, while in Ngai and Pissarides (2007), 
who focuses on exogenous total factor productivity differences across different sectors, all sectors 
have identical Cobb-Douglas production functions. More closely related to our paper are 
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2006, 2008), Zhang (2006), as well as Zuleta and Young (2007). 
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2006) first illustrate, when the elasticity of substitution of different 
products with different capital intensities in the aggregate production function of the final good is 
not equal to unity, the inevitable outcome of directed technical change is non-balanced growth 
between different sectors. Zuleta and Young (2007) developed a two-sector model of non-balanced 
economic growth with induced innovation, in which one sector (“goods” production) has 
technology differentiated by the elasticity of output with respect to capital and becomes 
increasingly capital-intensive over time.
4 Zuleta and Young (2007) further assume that although 
every technology is available at any instant, the adoption of a technology (i.e., innovation) is 
costly and the cost of innovation is increasing in its capital, thus creating a tradeoff between 
investment in capital and capital-intensity. In Zuleta and Young (2007), however, both the 
investment in capital deepening, and the investment to adopt a more capital intensive production 
function are the results of optimal decisions by an identical firm at any instant, and there is no 
creative destruction, i.e., more advanced products render previous ones obsolete (Schumpeter, 
1942, Segerstrom, et al. 1990, Grossman and Helpman, 1991a, and Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
5 
There are two sectors in the present model, the traditional sector, and the modern sector. 
Technological change in the traditional sector takes the form of horizontal innovation based on 
expanding variety (Romer, 1990), while technological progress in the modern sector is 
accompanied by incessantly creating advanced capital-intensive industry to replace backward 
labor-intensive industry, which is the distinctive characteristic of the present model. Our paper is 
the first attempt, to our knowledge, to address structural change with creative destruction, and to 
simultaneously address the fact that some products in the modern economy – such as the personal 
computer (PC) – become not only increasingly capita-intensive, but also progressively productive 
over time. 
The results of our model show that the optimal industrial structure in LDCs should not be the 
same as that in DCs, the (most) appropriate technology adopted in the modern sector in LDCs 
ought to be inside the technology frontier of the DCs, and the firm in the LDCs that enters 
capital-intensive, advanced industry in the DCs would be nonviable owing to the relative scarcity 
of capital in the LDCs’ factor endowments. Appropriate technology was first introduced by 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969), and has been revived recently by Diwan and Rodrik (1991) as well 
as Basu and Weil (1998). Basu and Weil (1998) is the first paper that provides the formal model to 
discuss appropriate technology in the economic growth framework. The authors argue that 
technology is specific to particular combinations of inputs, i.e., the capital-labor ratio in their 
paper. Nevertheless, technological progress in Basu and Weil (1998) is the by-product of 
                                                        
4  Seater (2005) developed a one sector exogenous growth model with the similar technical change as in Zuleta and 
Young (2007). 
5  There is no change of capital-intensity in Segerstrom, et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a), or Aghion 
and Howitt (1992). 
  4“localized learning by doing”, as introduced by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969). In the present paper, 
technological progress in the modern sector accompanied by increased capital intensity in the 
generation of products requires an intentional investment of resources by profit-seeking firms or 
entrepreneurs, which is emphasized in Grossman and Helpman (1994). Based on the endogenous 
growth model with expanding variety, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) argue that many 
technologies used by LDCs are developed in the OECD economies and are designed to make 
optimal use of the skills of the work force in the richer countries. Thus, the necessary outcome is 
low productivity in the LDCs owing to the scarcity of skills in these countries.
6 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs a specific model of 
endogenous economic growth that combines industrial structural upgrading with creative 
destruction. In section 3, we investigate the issues of endogeneity of industrial structure and 
appropriate technology as well as the firm’s viability in the LDC based on the dynamic trajectory 
of the present economy. Section 4 contains some brief concluding remarks. Finally, some details 
of the model that do not appear in the text are provided in the appendix. 
2. The Basic Model 
We consider a theoretical world consisting of a DC and an LDC that share the identical 
demographics but have distinct factor endowment structures,
7 i.e., the relative abundance of 
capital in the DC at time  , denoted by  0 t 0 () Kt , and the relative scarcity of capital in the LDC at 
time  , denoted by  0 t 0 ( Kt) . To simplify the analysis, we assume there is no international trade 
and no capital mobility in the present theoretical world. 
 
2.1 Consumer Behavior 
In both the DC and the LDC, there are   workers at time  , supplying their labor 
without any disutility.
() Lt t
8 The population has a constant exponential growth rate  . We also assume 
that all households share identical constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences over total 
household consumption index  , and all population growth takes place in existing 
households, which implies that the economy admits a representative agent with CRRA 
preferences: 
g 
(, ) Ct j
 










  t d t   (1) 
where    is a subjective discount rate,  0    is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and  
                                                        
6  There is never a problem of countries using technologies that do not match their level of development or 
endowment structure in Basu and Weil (1998), while an LDC in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) never has an 
opportunity to choose his appropriate technology. 
7  In the present paper, the upper bar is used as a superscript to indicate the variables in the DC, while the lower bar 
is an index of the LDC. 
8  We suppress time and country indexes when this causes no confusion. 
  5(, ) Ct j  represents an index of consumption (sub-utility function) of  j th generation goods at 
time  . To reflect the household’s tastes for diversity in consumption, we adopt for   a 
specification that imposes constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between consumption of 
traditional goods, denoted by  , and consumption of modern goods of 
t (, ) Ct j
1 C j th generation, denoted 
by  . Specifically, we have  2(, Ct ) j
  
1
12 (, ) ( 1 ) ( ) ,   0 Ct j C C j
        1     (2) 
(0,1) is the share parameter of the two goods above, and  (0,1)     where   determines the 
elasticity of substitution between consumption goods in the traditional sector and in the modern 
sector. It is convenient for us to choose traditional goods as numeraire and denote the price of 
modern goods of  j th generation to be  j p . 
The representative consumer maximizes (1) subject to an inter-temporal budget constraint. 
The consumption optimization problem can be solved in two stages. First, the representative 
consumer takes price  j p   as given and chooses   and    to maximize static utility in  1 C 2() Cj
()
(2) 




12 ,( ) max
CC (1 ) ( )
j CC j
          
subject to static budget constraint: 
  12 () j Cp C jE    (3) 
The first-order conditions of the above maximization problem yield the following demand 
functions for   and C :  1 C 2() j















   
 (4) 
and 


















Substituting (4) and  (5) into  (2) yields 
    () j Cj E p   
where   j p   amounts  to 
  6 
1
11
11 (1 ) (1 )

















Substituting   into   () j Cj E p  (1), the representative agent’s utility function becomes 











    
  t d t    (6) 
The second-stage consumption optimization problem involves choosing the time pattern of 
expenditures   to maximize  E (6) subject to the representative consumer’s inter-temporal budget 
constraint: 
  exp[ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
t R tR x E x d x B t

    (7) 
where  () R t
0exp[
t
  is the cumulative nominal interest factor from time 0  to  time  , i.e.,  t
( ) ( )] R t  r x  d x  with  (0) 1 R  , and  () B t   is the representative agent’s present value of 
the stream of factor incomes plus the value of initial asset holding at time  .  t
The inter-temporal optimization problem of the above representative agent implies the 










and the transversality condition 
  limexp( ) ( ) ( ) 0
t tt B t  
    
where    is the nominal interest rate at time  .  () rt t
Before leaving the consumption side of the economy, it will be useful for our later analysis to 
consider the relationship of the representative consumer’s spending allocated to traditional goods 
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   j   














 , which is the share of the 














   E
E
 (9) 
  7 
2.2 Producer Behavior and Static Equilibrium 
Turning to the production side, there are only two primary factors of production, capital   
and labor  , and two sectors in both the DC and the LDC. One is the traditional sector and the 
other is the modern sector. We assume the product in the traditional sector, denoted by  , can be 
used as consumption goods only, while the product in the modern sector, denoted by Y  






j th generation, can be consumed by households, installed by firms as 
capital, or invested by entrepreneurs as R&D expenditures. 
 
2.2.1 Production in the Traditional Sector 
We assume that the production of the homogenous goods   in the competitive traditional 




  1 YD   
which is a standard assumption in the economic growth literature. 
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991b), the index of intermediates   is  represented  by  D
 
1
0 () ,    0 1
N
Dz i d i

          (10) 
where    denotes the input of intermediate good  ;    is the number (measure) of available 
intermediate goods, i.e., the technology in the traditional sector; and 
() zi i N
  is the elasticity of 
substitution between different intermediate inputs. At every moment in time, the existing 
producers of intermediate goods engage in oligopolistic price competition, and intermediate good 
  is produced with the following Cobb-Douglas production function:  () zi
 
1 () () () ,  0 1 zi li ki
 
    (11) 
where   and   are labor and capital employed in the production of the existing 
intermediate good  . 
() li () ki
() zi
Facing the given price of the existing intermediate good  , which is denoted by  , 
and the price for the product of the traditional sector, which is normalized to be 1, the inverse 
demand function for the existing intermediate good   by the competitive firm in the 
traditional sector is given by: 




1 () ( ) () qi Y zi
 1     (12) 
  8And the profit maximization problem of the existing intermediate firm   can  be 




1 () , () () . ( ) ( ) . ( ) . ( )
liki Max Y l i k i wl i r k i
     (13) 
The first-order conditions in (13) are 
 
11 ( 1 )
1 () . ( ) ( ) Yl ik i
    
 w   (14) 
   (15) 
1( 1 )
1 ( 1 ) ( ) .() () Yl i k i




Combining (14) with  (15)  yields the existing intermediate firm  ’s factor demand functions  i
 
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) 1
1 () ( 1 )  ( ) li w r Y
             
             (16) 
 
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) 1
1
(1 )
() ( 1 )  ( )
w
ki w r Y
r
            
 

              (17) 
Substituting existing intermediate firm  ’s factor demand functions in  i (16) and (17) into (12), 
then  , i.e., the price of the existing intermediate good  , satisfies  () qi () zi
 
1( 1 ) () ( 1 )   qi wr
1   
      (18) 
Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium, all the existing intermediate firms in the traditional sector 
would charge the same price and share identical factor demand functions, which implies 
 





1   (19) 
where   and   are the total amount of labor and capital used in the traditional sector, 
respectively. 
1 L 1 K
 
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) 1
1 1 (1 )   L Nw r
            
           Y  (20) 
 
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) 1
1 1
(1 )
(1 )  
w
KN w r Y
r
           
 

             (21) 
Now the production function of the existing intermediate good   in  () zi (11) becomes 




() zi L K
N
 
  (22) 
and the production function of the traditional sector in (10)  could be rewritten as 
    
1
(1 )




   (23) 








   (24) 
  
1





   (25) 
  9Substituting (24) and (25) into (13), the profit function of the existing intermediate firm   in 
the traditional sector can be obtained by 
i
    
12
1





   (26) 
As in Judd (1985) and Romer (1990), we also assume that production of a new intermediate 
good requires R&D expenditures  1 X   in terms of the modern goods devoted to the invention of a 
new blueprint. Moreover, we also assume that process innovation outlays are made by private, 
profit-making entrepreneurs, who receive indefinite patent protection and will appropriate some of 
the benefits from a new process innovation in the form of oligopoly profits. The oligopolistic 
entrepreneur of intermediate firm   in the traditional sector’s present value of future operating 
profits from producing    discounted to time   is  given  by 
i
() zi t
    11 ( , ) exp[ ( ) ( )] ( , )
t Vi t R t Rx ix d x 

 
where  1(, ) ix   is the flow profits of firm   from producing intermediate good   in the 
traditional sector, which is expressed by 
i () zi
(26) at  time  x . 






Vi t i t
r




1  (27) 
With the spillover effect from the current stock of knowledge in the traditional sector to 
future process innovations emphasized in Romer (1990) in mind, we assume that if  1 X  units of 
modern goods engage in research in the traditional sector, they generate a flow of new products 
 given  by  N 
   
1
11 Nb NX
   
where   is a strictly positive constant measuring the technical difficulty of creating new 
blueprints in the traditional sector, and 
1 b
1 (1 , )     measures the degree of spillovers in 
technology creation. 
Then, with free entry by the intermediate firm  , if there are positive but finite resources 
devoted to R&D in the traditional sector at time  , we must have the zero-profit condition for 













  (28) 
 
2.2.2 Production in the Modern Sector 
  10Producing the product in the modern sector also requires variable inputs capital   and 
labor  , but not intermediates. The production function of the product of 
K
L j th generation in the 
modern sector is given by 
 
1
22 2 2 2 2 () F [ () , ,] () ,   1
jj
j Yj AjK L Aj KL
  
       
where      is an exogenously given parameter that satisfies    1    ,  ,   and  2 K 2 L j   is  capital 
and labor used, as well as the capital intensity in the modern sector for the product of  j th 
generation, respectively, and   is the productivity of the  2() Aj 1,2,... j  th generation product. 
The parameters in the present paper that satisfy 1 j       imply that the modern sector is 
more capital-intensive than the traditional sector at any moment. 
Following the literature on horizontal innovation or creative destruction (e.g., Segerstrom, et 
al., 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991a; as well as Aghion and Howitt, 1992), we assume the 
productivity of the  th generation in the modern sector, denoted by  , is exactly  1,2,... j  2() Aj
   times that of the generation before it. That is, we have 
  22 () ( 1 ) Aj Aj     
where    is an exogenously given constant that satisfies  1   . We choose units so that the 
productivity of the lowest generation with  0 j  , i.e., the one available at time   (the 
starting point of the analysis), is equal to unity; that is we assume 
0 t 
2(0) 1 A  .
9 
In contrast with the literature on horizontal innovation or creative destruction mentioned 
above – which focus on productivity (or product quality) rising only – the present paper embodies 
product innovation in technological progress that is incessantly capital intensive and progressively 
productive over time. We assume that the relationship between capital intensity  j   of the 




12 1 ( jj j b )
       
  (29) 
where   and  2 0 b  3 0   .
10 
Now the production function in the modern sector could be rewritten as 
                                                        
0 t
9  As the starting point of the analysis, we assume that the modern sector begins at time     with one firm 
which has access to a universally known backstop technology in the perfectly competitive output market and factor 
market until the first generation product is invented. 
() lim lim jt j tj
10  Equation (29) implies  in  infinite horizon we have   
    .  
 
  11 
1
22 2 2 () F [ () , ,]
j j Yj AjK L KL 2
j   
   (30) 
Of course, more advanced products, i.e., products with higher productivity and rising capital 
intensity, could not be produced until they have been invented. We follow the approaches taken in 
Aghion and Howitt (1992) as well as in chapter 4 of Grossman and Helpman (1991b), and assume 
that research in the modern sector produces a random sequence of product innovations. Any firm 
in the modern sector that carries out R&D at intensity   for a time interval of length   will 
succeed in its attempt to develop the product of generation 
dt
1,2,... j   based on the existing 
generation before it with probability  dt    which follows a Poisson distribution. R&D 




    in terms of modern goods when 
the entrepreneur attempts to develop the product, where 

2 1(  1 ) 1       reflects the fact that 
the more advanced the technology in modern sector, the more R&D expenditures are needed for 
further product innovation in this sector. Furthermore, we assume the parameters of the present 
model satisfy  12 (1 ) (1 )(1 )         to guarantee balanced growth between the 
traditional sector and the modern sector on the infinite horizon.
11 
Once the product of generation  1,2,... j   has been invented in the research lab, the 
successful innovator obtains a patent that is assumed to last forever on condition that no new 
generation has been invented; otherwise, the present generation product in the modern sector will 
be replaced by the next generation/vintage. And the producers with the requisite know-how and 
patent rights can manufacture the product of  j th generation in the modern sector according to the 
production function in (30). We assume that all firms in the modern sector engage in price 
competition in the output market and are price-takers in the factor market, and we also assume that 
only one leader-firm, e.g., firm  j , in the modern sector has access to the state-of-the-art 
technology. Another firm, a follower-firm, i.e., firm  1 j  , masters the technology that is one step 
behind it. 
For the moment, we assume innovations are always drastic, which means the successful 
innovator is unconstrained by potential competition from the previous patent.
12 
From  (4) and (5), the inverse demand function faced by a monopolistic firm  j  in the 



















Let us denote the fraction of modern goods of the  j th generation consumed by households 
                                                        
12 (1 ) (1 )(1 )
11 When        , non-balanced growth between the traditional sector and the 
modern sector implies that either the traditional sector or the modern sector will be trivial compared to the other 
sector in infinite horizon. 
12  Please see Lin and Zhang (2007b) for the details of the case of nondrastic innovations. 









13 then we have 

















  (31) 
Facing the given inverse demand function in (31), given factor prices   and  , the firm  j w j r
j   in the modern sector will choose   and    to maximize profit, given by:  2 K 2 L




















   (32) 













































j    (34) 
Combining (33) with (34) implies that the factor demand functions of firm  j  in  the  modern 

























    
 
 (35) 












Substituting  (35) and (36) into (32), we can solve the profit function of firm  j  in the 
modern sector as follows 






















  (37) 
And the price of the product of the  j th generation in the modern sector is determined by 
   





     
    

 (38) 
At time  , the value to an outside research firm  t j  that aims to develop a product whose 
productivity is     times as great as the state of the art and carries out R&D at intensity    when 
this firm is successful in the  j th product innovation, which is denoted by Vj , is the 
expected present value of the flow of monopoly profits 
2(,) t
2(,) j x   discounted to time  , where  t
                                                        
1 j     denotes the savings rate in the present model. 
13  It is obvious that 
  13the duration of  2(,) j x    follows the exponential distribution with parameter  x  : 
    22 (,) e x p [() () ] (,) (,)
t t R t R x j x j x d x 

   Vj
) where  (, j x   equals the probability that there will be exactly  j  innovations from the 










   
j Newcomer firm   in the modern sector would choose research intensity   for a time 
interval of length   to  maximize  dt
 
2
2 max ( , ) ( )( )
j
j Vj t d tpt d t

     (39) 
The maximization problem in (39) implies 
   
22
22 ( , ), 0  and  ( )( ) ( , )
jj
jj Vj t pt Vj t
       ( )( ) pt 0  
Thus, as long as the R&D operates at a positive but finite scale, we must have  0   , and 
. And the variation of the value to an outside research firm 
2 () ( )
j
j pt
   2(,) Vj t j  discounted 






Vj t j t
r




2  (40) 
 
2.3 Market Clearing Conditions 
We close the model by describing market clearing conditions. The output market clearing 
condition in the traditional sector implies 
  11 CY   
If we neglect capital depreciation in our model for simplicity, then the output market clearing 
condition in the modern sector is: 
    21 2 () () Cj KX X Yj    
2
According to the analysis above, the factor market clearing conditions can be expressed as: 
  12 LL L    
  12 KK K    
where   (K ) and   ( ) denotes the levels of labor (capital) used in the traditional and 
modern sectors, respectively. It is convenient for the analysis below to denote the fraction of labor 
1 L 1 2 L 2 K
















. From  (20), 




1 1 (1 ) (1 )
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) 1
1
1
(1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1




jj j j j wr
Nw r
      
          

    

 
    











1 1 (1 ) (1 )
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) 1
1
1
(1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
(1 ) (1 )











      
          






    





      
 
Since the traditional sector and the modern sector share the identical factor prices in 






















. Thus,  L    could characterize the industrial structure in the present 
model. 
 
2.4 Dynamic Equilibrium with an Infinite Horizon 
The dynamic equilibrium in this economy is given by paths for prices of factors, 
intermediates and modern goods  ,  ,  w r 1 [( ) ]
N
i qi  ,  p , allocations of factors  ,  ,  , 
, as well as R&D expenditures 
1 L 2 L 1 K
2 K 1 X ,  2 X  such that producers maximize profits, and the 
representative consumer chooses consumption and savings  ,   and  1 C 2 C E  to maximize his 
utility under the market clearing conditions. It is convenient for us to study equilibrium with an 
infinite horizon first, and then characterize the dynamic trajectory of the present economy. As 
regards equilibrium with an infinite horizon, we have the following prosposition (see the 
Appendix for the proof). 
 
Proposition 1: There exists a constant growth equilibrium (CGE) in the present economy 
with an infinite horizon, which means consumer expenditures   grow at a constant rate    E
*
E g
  15with an infinite horizon, i.e., 





, and the interest rate in CGE is also a constant, i.e., 
** lim E t rr g  
   . Furthermore,  12 (1 ) (1 )(1 )        implies that the CGE is 
also a unique balanced growth equilibrium (BGE), such that the modern sector and the traditional 


































  , and  . 
12
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EY Y ggg 
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3. Industrial Structure, Appropriate Technology,   
and Firm Viability in LDCs 
In this section, we will explore the issues of endogenous industrial structure, appropriate 
technology and viability of a firm in the LDCs based on the dynamic trajectory of the above basic 
model. 
 
3.1 Structural Change and Technological Progress in the Dynamic Trajectory 
Now we begin with the dynamic trajectories of the economy described in the present paper. 
The dynamic trajectories of this economy can be characterized by an autonomous system of 






  ,  1 X , and 
































First and foremost, we need to solve the equilibrium interest rate   in the dynamic 
trajectories. From 
r



















Second, we need to calculate the dynamics of capital intensity in the modern sector. We could 
invoke the property of a Poisson distribution to argue that the expected time of a firm in the 
modern sector that carries out R&D at intensity  () t   to develop the product of generation 
  161,2,... j   based on the existing generation before it is  1( ) dt t    (Feller, 1968). Therefore, 
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(1 )( 1) 2
2 Vt
(1 ) ( 1) (1 )


















  . 
Thus, the evolution of normalized accumulated R&D intensity, denoted by  , should satisfy  
   
(1 ) 1
(1 )(  1)
(1 ) ( 1) (1 )
2
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
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K  . 
Fourth, we need to characterize the evolution of technology in the traditional sector. 
Differentiating the zero-profit condition for firm    in the traditional sector, which is expressed by  i
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is determined by 
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   
  
      
      
 (49) 
Sixth, it is time for us to understand the law of price change in the present model. From (31), 
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    is infinitesimal and we neglect it in (51). 
Seventh, the Euler equation of the representative agent requires that the optimal path for the 
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  (52) 
Eighth, from (9), the dynamics of the fraction of modern goods consumed by households    
could be determined by 
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 , which is 
infinitesimal, in (53). 
Ninth, the market clearing condition in the modern sector implies the dynamics of normalized 
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     with the initial value of technology in the traditional sector at the starting 
point of the analysis, i.e., the exact value of   at  time  ( Nt ) 0 t  , denoted by  , as well as 
 assumed  above. 
(0) N
2 A (0) 1 
Summarizing the results above, we can characterize the dynamics of the present economy as 
well as industrial structural change and technological progress in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: The dynamic equilibrium of the present economy could be characterized by 
an autonomous system of nonlinear differential equations which contains eight variables,   ,   , 
,  ,  n L  p ,  ,  e  , and  , given by eight equations  k
0 ( Nt
(43), (45), (48), (49), (51), (52), (53), (54). 
Furthermore, in both LDCs and DCs, the evolution of industrial structure   and 
appropriate technology  , 
0) ( L t 
) 0 () j t ,  0 () t   at time  0 tt   is endogenously determined by 
the above autonomous system of nonlinear differential equations, as well as the capital stock 
 at  time    and initial conditions in labor and technology in the traditional sector and  0 () Kt 0 tt 
  19the modern sector, i.e.,  ,  , and  (0) L (0) N 0    at the starting point of the analysis  .  0 t 
 
3.2 Catch-up and Firm Viability in LDCs 
It is obvious from proposition 2 that we have  00 () () LL tt    ,  00 ()   () tt  , 
0 () () 0 j tj t  , and  0 () nt  0 () t n  when  00 () () 1 Kt Kt   at time  0 tt  . The ratio of capital 
in the DC to that in the LDC, denoted by  KK , could be interpreted broadly, as a metaphor for 
the LDC’s current stage of development. The larger  KK   is, the more backward the economy in 
this LDC, and  KK  will decrease and approach unity eventually as the LDC converges to the 
DC. Moreover, the ratio of technology in the DC to that used in the LDC denotes the distance to 
the technology frontier in the LDC, where  NN   denotes the distance to the technology frontier 
of the traditional sector, and  jj  denotes the distance to the technology frontier of the modern 
sector. When these terms are large, the LDC is far from the world technology frontier. 
As pointed out in section 1, motivated by the dream of nation building, most of the LDC 
governments pursued a catch-up type strategy to accelerate the development of the then advanced 
capital-intensive industries after World War II. Thus, in reality, the actual industrial structure and 
technology adopted in LDCs may deviate from that endogenously determined in proposition 2. If 
we define the industrial structure and technology in an LDC endogenously determined in 
proposition 2 as the optimal industrial structure and (most) appropriate technology in that country, 
by summarizing the analysis above, we obtain the following result. 
Corollary 1: Owing to the relative scarcity of capital in LDCs, endogenous industrial 
structural change and technological progress on the dynamic trajectory imply that the (optimal) 
industrial structure in LDCs should not be the same as that in DCs; the (most) appropriate 
technology adopted in the modern sector in LDCs ought to be inside the technology frontier of the 
DCs. 
On the viability of the firm in the government’s priority industries when this government 
pursued a catch-up type strategy to accelerate development of the then advanced capital-intensive 
industries, we obtain the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: When an LDC government pursues a catch-up type strategy, the firm in this 
LDC that enters a capital-intensive, advanced industry of the modern sector in the DCs would be 
nonviable owing to the relative scarcity of capital in the factor endowments of the LDCs. 
Proof: We will prove proposition 3 based on an extreme assumption first, then extend it to 
the general case. The extreme assumption is that we model the catch-up type strategy in the LDC 
whose capital stock equals to  0 () Kt  at time  0 tt   by assuming that the actual industrial 
structure and technology chosen by the government in the LDC coincides with those in the DC 
whose capital stock equals  0 () Kt  at  time  0 tt    for tractability, i.e.,  00 () () Nt Nt  , 
  2000 () () j tj t  ,  00 () () t   t , and  0 () () LL t 0 t     at  time  0 tt  , when  00 () () Kt Kt  . 
From the analysis in subsection 2.2, we know that, without external subsidies, as long as 
R&D operates at a positive but finite scale, the present value of firm  j  in any country 
discounted to time  , denoted by  , must satisfy the free-entry condition, i.e.,  0 t
2 ,
20 (, ) Vj t
2
0 () ( ) ( )
j
j 0 p t
  V j t . Naturally, the present value of the firm in the DC, whose capital stock 
equals  0 () Kt , which enters industry  j  discounted to time  , denoted by  0 t 20 (,) Vj t, meets 
the above free-entry condition precisely, because there is positive and bounded R&D intensity in 
the DC, which implies that we have 
 
2
02 0 () ( ) (,)
j
j tV j
   t p  (55) 
Equation (40)  could be reformulated as 
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   into  (56) yields 
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  is a higher-order infinitesimal term which could be 
neglected in (58). Therefore, given  00 () () Nt Nt  ,  00 ) () ( j tj t  ,  0 () () t   0 t , and 
  210 () () LL t   0 t  at time  ,  0 tt 
2
02 () ( ) (,)
j
j 0 p tV
   j t  is a direct conclusion from (55) 
when  0 () () Kt Kt  0 , which means that the firm in the modern sector of the LDC would be 
nonviable if this LDC imitates the industrial structure and copies the most advanced technologies 
used in the DC exactly. 





  is a continuous function of all its arguments, thus, 
when there is a severe scarcity of capital in the LDC, i.e.,  0 () () Kt Kt 0   is much greater than 1, 
the conditions that  00 () N Nt   () Nt ,  00 () () j jt jt   , and   00 () () LL tt       
when  ,  0 N  0 j   , and      are all small enough, could still suffice for 
2
0 0 () ( )
j
j 2 (,) t t
  V j ,  thereby  we  would  obtain  proposition  3.          Q.E.D.  p
Therefore, it is imperative for the government to introduce a series of regulations and 
interventions to mobilize resources for setting up and supporting the continuous operation of the 
non-viable firms. This type of economy might become very inefficient as the result of 
misallocation of resources (Lin, 2007, Lin and Zhang, 2007a). 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In the present paper, we have developed an endogenous growth model that combines 
structural change with repeated product improvements. The distinctive characteristic of our model 
originates from the technology in the modern sector, which becomes not only increasingly 
capital-intensive, but also progressively productive over time as the result of innovation by the 
profit-seeking firms. Each technology in the modern sector is appropriate for one and only one 
capital-labor ratio, i.e., the technologies in the modern sector are specific to particular factor 
endowment structures. Therefore, we could draw the conclusion that an LDC’s optimal industrial 
structure and the (most) appropriate technology are endogenously determined by that economy’s 
endowment structure, and the optimal industrial structure in LDCs should not be the same as that 
in DCs. That is, the (most) appropriate technology adopted in the modern sector in the LDCs 
ought to be inside the technology frontier of the DCs, and a firm in an LDC that enters 
capital-intensive, advanced industry in a DC would be nonviable owing to the relative scarcity of 
capital in the factor endowments of LDCs. We hope the framework developed in the present paper 
provides a new line of thought for analyzing the root cause of the differences in economic 
performance in LDCs. Our argument is that whether the industrial structure and technology 
adopted in LDCs match the factor endowment structure is the fundamental reason for the diversity 
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  25Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1 
We guess-and-verify the existence of a unique constant growth equilibrium (CGE) in infinite 










Substituting (8) into  (59) implies 
 
** lim E t rr g 
    
which means the interest rate in CGE is also a constant. 
We focus here the special case of CGE, i.e., a balanced growth equilibrium (BGE), such that 
modern sector and traditional sector grow at the same constant rate in infinite horizon for 
simplicity. The conditions that guarantee the existence of a BGE in the present model is 
  12 (1 ) (1 )(1 )         
which will be proved in the analysis below. 
In BGE, the fraction of modern goods of the  j th generation consumed by the households is 
constant, i.e., 
*
() lim lim jt j tj  































   with respect to time    implies in BGE  t
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Equation (9) and   imply that in BGE the share of the representative consumer’s 
spending allocated to traditional sector, denoted by  , is a constant and 
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Let us first derive the growth rates of the key objects in traditional sector in BGE. 
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where 

















  (62) 
Differentiating the zero-profit condition for firm   in traditional sector which is expressed 
by 
i
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In BGE, we have show that 
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Differentiating the profit function of the existing immediate firm   in traditional sector 
which is expressed by 
i








































Now we turn to the growth rate of the key objects in modern sector in BGE. The properties of 
the Poisson distribution imply that in infinite horizon, the expected number of product innovations 
in a time interval of length   is  t
*t   (Feller, 1968). Thus, in infinite horizon, the production 
  27function in modern sector becomes 
 
* 1
22 2 , lim F [ ( ), , ]
t







*    is the optimal rate of innovations in the long-run. 
















Therefore, the growth rate of modern sector in BGE is given by 
   (68) 
22




















From (33), the interest rate in BGE can be expressed by 





























Differentiating (69)  with respect to time   yields  t
   (70) 
12
** * (1 ) l n ( 1 ) ( 1) YK gg           
Combining (68) with  (70) yields 




The fact that 
1
*
K K gg 
*
 implies the fraction of capital used in traditional sector is a 
constant in BGE, i.e.,  K   is a constant, where  . Thus, from 
* lim ( ) KK t t 












, we know the fraction of labor used in traditional sector is also a 
constant in BGE, i.e.,    is a constant, where  , which implies that 





LL gg     
Substituting   into 
1
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Because the product innovations occur in the modern sector according to a time-varying 
Poisson process with instantaneous arrival rate  () x    and the expected number of success before 
  28time   equals to  t
0 () ( )
t
tx d x    , thus, the properties of the Poisson distribution imply that 
j   amounts to 
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In BGE, the profit function of the firm  j  in modern sector which is expressed by (37) 
reduces to 




























2 ln ( 1    
 (71) 
Differentiating (71)  with respect to time   yields  t
   (72) 
12
** * * * ) ln (1 ) YK gg            




2 ln K g      (73) 














   
And the optimal intensity of innovations in the long-run, denoted by 













*   
From the analysis above and comparing the growth rate in modern sector with that in 
traditional sector in BGE, we know the parameters of our model which satisfy 
  12 (1 ) (1 )(1 )         
could indeed guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the BGE in the present paper. 
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Finally, the fraction of modern goods consumed by households in BGE, denoted by 
*  , can 
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as well as the capital stock  0 () Kt e  0 tt  at  tim    an tial conditions of labor and technologies 
in traditional sector and modern sector, i.e.,  (0) L ,  (0) N , 
d ini
0   and  a artin (0 j   ) t the st g point 
of the analysis, i.e., at time  0 t  . 
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